Vikalpa. Vol. 5, No. 3. July 1980 A much-lamented technology gap between industrially developed countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs) is now an agreed explicator of the difference in standards of material well being. Much development effort has therefore focused on closing this gap. Some have even considered developing all technology indigeneously. But the process is too slow and the progress inadequate. The politicran-policymaker in some of the LDCs is in a hurry to catch up. For him, acquiring latest technology is more than just a national economic imperative. It symbolizes power and ability to do things big-an emotive appeal. This hurry might mean that technology must be imported. But the technology transferrer, usually, has a more business-like interest. So does the financier who is often either an aid giving DC or a DCinfluenced international developmental agency.
Many LDCs have oriented themselves to a development strategy based more on technology transfer and less -on technology development. There are however questions such as what technology to obtain, when to seek, and from where to get. Different nations have had different answers to these. Their history over the last couple of decades provides some clues to these answers, which will be explored in this paper.
There are also political motives behind such transfer of technology which means that technology transfer cannot be equated to acquisition in a literal sense. It involves a play of opposing and/or divergent forces, generated by a variety of needs, and exercised through diverse and multiple channels.
Some of these forces and factors find expression in theories of trade. These theories, however, have been too quick to explain technology transfer. Most of these also focused on either some specific aspect of commodity demand or of its supply. They stressed the technology trade linkage to the complete exclusion of autonomous technology demands, whereas the great variety in patterns of technology acquisition by LDCs points, to the latter factor being extremely dominant. We have, therefore, proposed a framework which takes this factor explicitly into account. The rest of the paper develops this framework. In the next section, some trade theories as applied to technology transfer are briefly surveyed, which is followed by a discussion of our framework in the light of recent technology transfer data from 13 LDCs. The final section summarizes major propositions about why different LDCs acquire technologies for different products, or acquire them in different chronological orders.
Do We Need Another Theory?
Transfer of technology has largely been treated as a by-product of the theory of compartive advantage.
1 This theory postulates that nations specialize in commodities whose production uses relatively more of the more abundant factors of production (labour/capital) in the land. Labour surplus economies, accordingly, would produce and export labour-intensive products. Consequently, such economies would shun acquiring capital-intensive technologies. However, this two-factor naivete got a jolt from the finding of Leontieff (1956) that export from the United States, a capital-rich country, were dominated by labour intensive products (see also 1. The original Ricardian theory was primarily normative; it was concerned with welfare. Heckscher and Ohlin have axiomatized it with assumptions about similar production functions in all countries (see Takayama, 1972 ). Takayama, 1972) . Ever since, economists have been working to question assumption's such as homogeneity of factors, exclusion of demand, and existence of only two factors of production, and to augment this theory (Takayama, 1972; Hufbauer, 1970) . One current explanation views human capital or special skills as an additional factor. The United States is predictably rich in this factor too and therefore Leontieff's above paradox is explained (Stewart, 1973; Kenen, 1965; Bhagwati, 1965) . Or is it? How are we to explain the emergence of skill advantage itself? Is it a dynamic transformation of capital abundance, or do some sociological and/or imperialistic (unequal exchange) arguments provide the answer? The neo-Heckscher-Ohlin theory remains silent on this issue.
Drawing implications for technology transfer from the classical and neoclassical theories raises further doubts. Technology is still treated as a free good, there are no informational costs, and no barriers to trade other than tariff walls. The country as a whole is presumed to exhibit some kind of optimizing behaviour. Every trading country is supposed to maximize simultaneously some long-run consumption based on an aggregate production function, and thus to derive its choices of technologies. For a free trade economy, these choices are made worthwhile for entrepreneurs through suitable fiscal means. Else, central decisionmakers exercise the choices acting as the international technological gate keepers 2 (Allen et al., 1971 ).
While such unrealism may justify a vision, it certainly helps no theory. There are at least two problems here. First, nations or entrepreneurs do not all have a uniform goal structure and decision process, still less are they likely to maximize a simple criterion that the neoclassical economic pardigm builds on. We shall further explore this point 2. This,concept way be a useful concept for innovative forces; its significance at the national level is not at all obvious.
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Vikalpa later in the paper. The other drawback in using neoclassical theory for technology transfer issues is the obvious neglect of barriers between national markets, market sizes and price elasticities of demand, and the actual mechanics of learning and progressive economies in a new production establishment. It is this latter set of issues, especially demand, that the product life cycle theory sought to incorporate in a new approach to international trade.
The product life cycle theory (Wells, 1972 ) views developed countries a,s the only innovator of new products and technologies. These countries, particularly the United States, have large markets with a sufficiently large segment of high income buyers who have a low price elasticity of demand for new products. Hence, despite . the fact that innovations have a high 'initial price, they find a ready market. In addition proximity to such a market ensures that a) needs of consumers in this market are easily perceived by innovators, b) risk capital is easily available, and c) market reaction to an innovation is quickly fed back to the innovation process. Besides, innovators need not initially commit new plant and equipment because an industrially developed economy provides access to specialized skills in a ready market.
Further, the product life cycle theory postulates stages in the life of a product. The early stage is marked by low price elasticity for aggregate and firm demand, short production runs and changing techniques with low capital intensity but high skills, and a very small number of firms. However, opportunities cause competition, more firms enter, technology begins to settle after market reaction so that mass production is possible. This also means that some producers have to cater to segments which are more price sensitive Competition on price therefore emerges in the growth stage. In the mature final stage, the process of competition continues but differentiation through marketing may emerge, production tends to get automated, and mergers and marketing failures tend to reduce the number of firms.
For technology transfer to LDCs, the product life cycle theory implies a perpetual technological gap. As an LDC's demand for a product picks up, MNCs would attempt to maintain their world share by foreign direct investment in that country. Alternatively, technological collaboration with a local may emerge. The timelag of transfer will depend on: economies of scale; tariff and transportation cost; size of local market (demand structure); and extent of skill needed in production.
Therefore, technologies for products with very high economies of scale may never reach LDCs, except where regional (multi-country) markets can be more cheaply serviced from a regional location, in which case just one of the countries in the region gets the technology. Besides, high tariff walls around a reasonable sized economy may make it worthwhile to reap the benefits of protection through foreign direct investment. Finally, towards the more mature part of a product's life, technology may become so standardized that only unskilled labour is required. Then, it may even be economical to produce in an LDC and export to developed countries. Technology transfer in this theory too is derived from trade implications, as our last paragraph must show. However, the emphasis is on demand aspects, unlike the supply emphasis of the neoclassical theory. The technology of productidn, instead of being a free good, is here a very scarce commodity internal to a few firms in developed nations. But the theory admits of only one kind of technology for a commodity at a particular stage. Hence, choice of capital intensity for a recipient does not exist. Acquiring dated technology, factor-appropriate technology, unbundling, etc., do not fit into this linear theory, , leading to the single most damning feature: . 5, No. 3, July 1980 it does not recognize that LDCs may themselves have different strategies of development (right or wrong) and consequent policies for technology acquisition. In the product life cycle theory, MNC is the solitary engine of technology transfer. This is consistent with a perfectly free trade world, but not with fervent nationalism, active state direction, and conscious choice of even costlier import substitution as followed by many LDCs. It also ignores technology adaptation processes and differences in the capabilities of different LDCs.
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Indeed, the assumption here and in the neoclassical paradigm that technology transfer springs from trade may count for only a small subset of transfer to LDCs. There is ample evidence that over the last thirty years, many LDCs have acquired technologies which neither theory would predict.
3 Yet, there are also transfers which factor proportions (including raw material-mostly minerals-availability) or market size would support. The next section, therefore, reassembles these and other factors behind technology transfer and, with the help of data, attempts to show their impact on technology transfer to LDCs.
Towards a Broader Framework
Technology and Economies of Scale In our context of transfer of manufacturing technology, it is necessary to define technology narrowly. We include in technology a) techniques, processes, or formulations for the manufacture of a product b) physical plant or machinery, and c) patent for manufacture. This definition does not follow the ones adopted in the existing literature, but is chosen to facilitate explanation of actually observed behaviour among many nations and their firms. The emphasis is more on transfer than on technology per se.
For example, getting a patent may 'not add to knowledge, still it may be the most crucial transfer. This is true for export of a patented article or a patented process, and sometimes for its domestic marketing for brand based selling. On the other hand, the crucial transfer in steel or petrochemicals manufacturing could . be the plant itself. Thus, our three-way classification of technology has a direct bearing on the ease or otherwise of transfer.
Economies of scale refers to reduction in unit costs of production through higher capacity plants. As we mentioned, this partly determines transfer in the product life cycle theory. However, this takes a very narrow view of foreign investment decision criteria of MNCs. The evidence indicates that profitability-least costis not the only criterion in this process (Aharoni, 1966) . Nor is there much sanctity in the estimates of economies that decision makers are deemed to act upon. So, the causal logic of the product life cycle theory does not appear to be' fully valid.
However, it is useful to approach the issue from the angle of the LDC entrepreneur or government. Let us distinguish between cases where plants are to.be transferred and where techniques or processes suffice. In the former case, the choice is between plants of, say, two types operating in two countries. The question is: Do we import a plant of the type operating in country A or in country B ? In some cases more than one firm in a country may operate plants of different sizes. If there are very large scale differences, the economies are clear. But with narrower differences, which are more common, it is difficult to reliably compare. The choice-set is further constrained by availability of tied credit, payment terms, export conditions, etc. Besides, the evaluating ability in LDCs is frequently not up to the task. Proposition 3 Technologies needed for further processing of indigenous natural resources or minerals (for forward integration) will be high in the priority of LDC governments.
Proposition 4 Technologies for labour intensive production will be high in the priority of most LDCs.
Also, there is evidence (Helleiner, 1973 ) that MNCs shift the more labour intensive parts of their vertical integration chain of manufacture or service to LDCs with extremely low wage rates. Hence, it can be said that:
Proposition 5 LDCs acquire technologies for the more labour intensive segments of MNC operations, when they are prepared to function as links in an international production network.
The difference between propositions 2 and 5 is that the latter depends on large intercountry wage differences while the former is a matter of suitable match between technological scale economies and market size. The latter is a recent phenomenon in which the final product may not be directed to LDCs at all.
Market Size, Regional Integration, and Strategic Location Size of a market depends on population, and income and its distribution. High income, distributed inequitably, would provide market for new and luxury * goods, as the product life cycle theory indicates. LDCs having small markets are therefore unprofitable to MNCs. Yet, regional trade agreements (LAFTA, Andean Pact, etc.) may overcome the market limitation, without, of course, determining the actual choice of nation within the integrated set. Besides, some countries may find their location itself to be of strategic political importance. So, an industrially developed superpower may transfer sophisticated technologies through MNCs, despite small market size. The donor state may also arrange for cheaper funds for it to be worthwhile to the MNC. Taiwan is an example. We may, therefore, propose :
Proposition 6 Market size is the major determinant of transfer of technology through global expansion of MNC's.
Proposition 7
Regional integration allows nations of even small market size to obtain technologies with high scale economy.
Proposition 8 Strategic location may lead to acquiring, or increasing the bargaining power for sophisticated technology.
In eight propositions, we have linked technology transfer to LDCs with scale economies,factor and natural resource endowment, wage rate, market size, regional integration, and strategic location. These factors, however, constitute only the structure of given differences between LDCs. There is another factor, strategy, which in many cases is the prime mover. It gives direction to progress and prevents the nation from moving along the path of established comparative advantage.
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National Strategy
Most development literature has identified two strategic typologies: inward looking and outward looking. Outward looking strategy emphasizes openness in trade and factor movements. It is exhibited in export promotion. Inward looking, on the other hand, restricts trade and develops import-substituting industry (Streeten, 1973, p. 2) . This two-way classification, however, does not explain much of what happens in LDCs. Nowhere is import substitution a blanket policy for all goods. Nor is export promotion emphasized in all sectors. Besides, there* is evidence of LDCs having tight import controls and yet making considerable export (e.g.,'Nigeria and Venezuela).
Therefore, looking at strategy from such a decision perspective may be misleading. Instead, particularly for the technology transfer issue, we prefer to look at apparent strategic action.
We do not believe that decisionmakers in LDCs have any unidimensional exclusive inward or outward looking strategies. Policies to restrict import may, for example, be a response to balance of payments pressure. In most cases, policies towards imports may be only loosely connected with those towards exports. The expectations of aid, of personal or group gains from specific actions, a disregard of the spectre of devaluation, etc., may all loosen this connection. As a result, there is greater meaning in treating import restrictiveness and export orientation as independent policy variables. The first refers to how much the nation restricts imports as a matter of policy. The second refers to how much the leadership emphasizes exports.
In addition to these two, we identify another independent .force, a deeper commitment, more long term and probably related to the common life worlds of the people and^ their leaders. This we call the self-reliance orientation. By self-reliance orientation we refer to the aspiration In an LDC to become independent of foreign sources in the further growth of the economy. This independence is usually seen in terms of having an industrial structure capable of producing sufficient consumption goods, intermediates, and investment goods, often in that order. This order implies that the country woujd first have only a minimum necessary consumption goods capacity, then the capacity for intermediates necessary for these consumption .goods, and then investment goods, This strategy may be termed backward integration as opposed-to diversification of the consumer goods industry. Usually, the former implies higher capital intensity and lower growth of employment. Besides, the relevant technologies involve high volume production.
The three orientations together constitute elements of strategy perceived from actions, and relevant to technology transfer.
Measuring Strategic Orientation
To operationalize these three constructs, we studied 13 LDCs through country studies which recount their developmental patterns and policies in recent history. The first two orientationsimport restrictiveness and export orientationwere partly evaluated through data on exports and imports as percentage of GNP, and partly through a reading of the actual import and export actions. This latter view is impressionistic, but is also meaningful because policies have wavered and what we want to construct is the overall emphasis. The hard data are given in Table 1 for 1973. Here, a very high export percentage will obviously imply a HI (High) export orientation, as in Singapore and Malaysia. On the other hand, Lo (Low) export orientation is exhibited in India and Paraguay. The remainder would be moderate (M) on this dimension. This matches with impressions from country studies, except in the case of South Korea, where export orientation has been all-pervasive in the policies and action of the government hierarchy. Also, export incentives were liberal though, in 274 Vikalpa mid-sixties, indirect incentives (exchange rate credit preference, etc.) replaced direct ones, (Cole and Lyman, 1971, p. 189) . In view of this, we classify South Korea as HI on export orientation. We have similarly treated Panama as having moderate (and not LO) orientation based on evidence that its growth has largely been export dependent (Merrill et a/., 1975, p. 35) .
Regarding import restrictiveness, we have classified a country as LO if the imports ratio greatly exceeds the exports ratio, and HI if the opposite is true. However, in the case of Malaysia, other rules and actions indicate a LO (and not M) restrictiveness (IIFT, 1972, p. 408) .
Finally, our classificaticn along the self-reliance orientation is judgemental. What we have looked for in the various country studies to arrive at our judgement is the sub section on development planning. Within such a sub-section, if we notice an emphasis on meeting most requirements through domestic production and explicit negative attitude towards imported goods, we classify the nation as HI on the scale. On the other hand, if we find no talk of development planning or find an appreciation of trade only, we classify it as LO. the remainder we categorized as moderate (M).
Strategy and Technology Transfer
We have, ranked 13 LDCs on the three dimensions of strategic orientation in Table 1 . The significance of this ranking can be seen i f i t i s r e l a t e d t o t h e d a t a i n T a b l e 2 , which gives a chronological record of technology transfer. The dates show when the technologies became operational in the receiving country. The list excludes processed primary products of local origin (vegetable oils, plywood, etc.) ancl traditional labour intensive products (textiles, footwear, etc.). Plastic and wooden items, glassware, pottery, etc., are also excluded: In these cases, the kind of manufacturing technology involved has been widely disseminated. They have very low scale economies too. Therefore, their relevance to technology is minimal. The classification of goods that we have considered is five-fold: consumption diversifying goods (cars, TV, etc.) general transport (motor-coach, railway wagon, etc.), agri-linked ch'emicals (superphosphate, insecticides, power-tillers, etc.) infrastructual goods (steel, cranes, bulldozers, etc.) industries with high scale economies (manmade fibres; bulk drugs, etc.).
. }>**, So me Illustrative Explanations
To analyse the effect of strategy, let us make a few tyVGT.way comparisons.
Venezuela and Malaysia are both of comparable size and endowed with natural resources (petroleum in Venezuela vs. rubber,in Malaysia). But Malaysia is HI on export ostentation with LO on the-rest. Venezuelans HI on import restrictiveness and self-reliance orientation. Correspondingly, Malaysia has given priority to consumption diversifying and general transport goods. However, Venezuela opted first for import substitution of aluminium and steel.
We can also look at the record of South Korea with HI export orientation and LO import restrictiveness. Hence, the consumption diversifying, agri-linked, and high scale economy goods, for export (manmade fibre, electronic goods etc.) took priority. On the other hand, Algeria with HI self-reliance orientation opted first for steel and rail-Coach making, then for agrilinked goods and other infrastructure! equipment.
A similar comparison can be done between Cuba and another small country, Panama. Being HI on self-reliance, Cuba has acquired infrastructural technologies. None of these was chosen by other smaller nations, not even by relatively larger LDCs like South Korea, Malaysia, or Thailand. Vol. 5. No. 3, July 1980 215 The examples of Ghana and Nigeria show the inherent wastefulness of being just import restrictive. Ghana and Nigeria are both exporters of cocoa. In addition, Ghana exports gold while Nigeria exports oil. Nigeria is freer-in trade, Ghana somewhat more oriented to self-sufficiency and somewhat less to export. The consequences on technology transfer are then clear. Ghana developed its aluminium industry early to use the local ore. It also acquired technologies for manufacture of telephones and assembly of trucks. Only later did it go for assembly of cars. Nigeria, on the other hand, got the labour-intensive TV receiver and tyres and tubes technologies to start with. Even paper manufacture started later and sewing machines only recently. Its oil, now exported in crude form, is yet to be a source for any valuable processing, much less of further uses of petroleum. Thus, while it has a low self-sufficiency orientation, its export orientation is also not strong enough to integrate forward.
Nigeria has acquired much the same mix of industries as Ghana, a much smaller country. However, Ghana and Indonesia, both having similar moderate stances, have acquired similar sets-consumption diversifying and general transport. However, the largeness of Indonesia has allowed it to be more diversified. Besides a comparison with South Korea shows that the Indonesian consumption goods industry is considerably more diversified, while South Korea has acquired selected technologies.' That is, lack of a sharp strategy may reflect in a much more diversified consumption goods industry to an exclusion of other sectors than a sharp export oriented strategy would.
Cuba acquired wagon, motor-coach, crane, and bulldozer technologies to the exclusion of others. It already had a prosperous sugarcane industry but instead of diversifying, it integrated backwards. The fact that it could not go further, say to integrated steel production, is however due to its evident smallness (Thomas, 1974, p. 46) . (Note that the technologies acquired by Cuba are of the type that need transfer of technique and have fairly low economies.) In the case of India, this strategy is superposed on the autonomous influence of a large market. Integrated steel, petrochemicals, and bulk drug technologies reflect this strategic influence. The diversification in consumption industries (not shown in Table 2 ) may however be attributed to the market size itself. The lack of such a strategy, as we see in Paraguay, has resulted in a structure with none of the above technologies.
In Thailand, industry has diversified into car (assembly) and motorcycles. However, possible backward integration to manufacture superphosphates and pesticides has clearly not occurred. Thus, we find clear support that a high selfreliance oriented strategy in an LDC tends to encourage earlier transfer of backward integrated technologies.
The general consequence of import restrictiveness is to distort the prices in the economy. Simultaneously, however, it gives a boost to local non-comparative advantage industry. Thus, the transfer of manmade fibre technology to India, Algeria, and Indonesia in the private sector is the result of this restrictive orientation. In fact, this particular orientation is directly related to protection of local industry measured by the effective rate of protection in market-oriented LDCs. It is worth mentioning that regional integration, which we mentioned earlier, as a factor in technology transfer can result in an orientation which is restrictive to the world but free to the union. For example, the LAFTA nations (including Venezuela and Paraguay) may be moving towards more comparative advantage technologies. Thus while Paraguay continues with its consumption goods based on livestock and timber, Venezuela has expanded vertically into steel and petroleum-based chemicals as well as diversified into refrigerators and batteries.
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Thus, a low import restrictiveness strategy in an LDC encourages transfer of technology for goods in whose manufacture the country has a higher comparative advantage A restrictive orientation encourages transfer of technologies in non-comparative advantage goods. This may lead to diversification of the consumption goods sector if there is low self-sufficiency orientation and to backward integration otherwise.
Export orientation appears strong in Singapore, Panama, and South Korea, but weak in India. Cuba, though less open, still has a fairly strong export orientation. This strategy builds usually on labour intensive manufacture or on the existence of mineral wealth or natural resources.
A combination of export orientation and reasonable free trade orientation comes to the product life cycle theory predicted post-mature transfer of manufacturing facilities from LDC to developing countries. This, for example, has caused South Korea to obtain sophisticated technologies for semiconductors and integrated circuits, almost all the output being exported.
It may appear that a high export oriented strategy in an LDC encourages transfer of technologies for forward integration on minerals. When combined with free trade orientation, the LDC tends to receive (through foreign direct investment by M INCs) technologies for high volume production of consumption goods or intermediates.
Venezuela and Algeria are not strictly comparable, Algeria having attained independence only recently. But both are oil-rich states. Algeria is restrictive in imports and high on self-sufficiency orientation. Consequently, we find in Algeria steel plants with sophisticated technology, rail-coach, tractor and crane manufacturing, manmade fibre, and naptha. Venezuela, on the other hand, started with refrigerators, batteries, and petrochemicals. That is, while Algeria (through self-sufficiency strategy) attempted to extend the structure backwards, Venezuela diversified and integrated forward in petroleum (based on freer trade and export orientation).
These comparisons yield, as shown in Table  3 , the apparent priorities that different strategies led. Based on these analyses, the following propositions may be advanced:
Proposition 9 A high export oriented strategy yields transfers of consumption diversifying, general transport, agri-linked, and high scale economy goods in that order, Proposition 10 With self-reliance as a dominant strategy, technologies for infrastructure! goods, agri-linked, general transport goods, and consumption diversfying goods are obtained in that order.
Proposition 11 A purely import restrictive nation obtains technologies for general transport, and then for consumption diversifying.
Proposition 12 Lack of a sharp strategy leads to transfers for consumption diversifying goods and then for general infrastructure.
We have attempted to use the strategystructure conceptual .schema -as an explanatory model to explain the technology acquisition behaviour among a selected band of LDCs. Before it can be used as a prescriptive/predictive model, the twelve propositions generated during the discussion need to be empirically tested out over a larger sample and over a longer period of time. More importantly, the "reasons why" behind these propositions need to be explored and understood with greater clarity. Some of the impressionistic measures also need to be refined before the model can be used with more confidence. This could be the next phase in pursuing research in this area.
A Conceptual Schema
We have considered a variety of factors and shown in Figure 1 that they are all relevant to the technolgy transfer space. In this schema,we have summarized the arguments. It shows that technology transfer to an LDC occurs by acquisition, or by foreign direct investment by an MNC. The strategic orienta- . 5, No. 3, July 1980 . Figure 1 tions along with, other national and technological data influence an LDC's decision to accuire a technology, or an MNC's decision to transfer technology. Besides, if an LDC is located strategically for a superpower, it may cause a flow of technology at extremely favourable terms. In fact, this may take the form of outright aid. The manner in which all these variables interact is already described.
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Policy Implications
The above schema, it should be clear, is an exercise in understanding what LDCs have been doing and why. Yet the analysis goes no deeper than the surface of the political blackbox which throws up our three strategic orientations. It is common with policy specialists to recommend, for example, that one or more of these strategic orientations be changed. The hitch of course is that since we are ignorant of how these orientations are formed, still more of how they can be changed, we are only shooting in the dark at a black bear. However, if we keep away from the more crucial, though obviously unclear, elements of the schema, we can pinpoint certain possibilities.
For example, if an LDC is strategically located, the tendency for a superpower to force down , consumption-diversifying industries can be counteracted. The needs of the superpower can be balanced with the strategic orientation in the LDC so that internal goals are satisfied.
Looking from the viewpoint of an MNC, investment opportunities can be more effectively screened through an explicit consideration of LDC strategies. On the other hand; some LDCs have suffered through an excess of import restrictiveness, leading, in the long run, to severe foreign exchange crises. An MNC which perceives the LDC's need to shift towards an export oriented strategy can accelerate the process by providing its own marketing expertise.
Finally, the long run effects of strongly pursuing any of the strategic orientations can be seen in terms of industrial structure, foreign dependence, and employment. These can be evaluated within the constraints of national endowments so as to assess the pros and cons of alternative strategies. Where decision-making is centralized and the economy can be tightly directed, this analysis of strategy can be used as an input to decision-making for realignment of the economy.
The augmented model quite explicitly accounts for differences in the transfer histories of different developing nations. This is through viewing technology acquisition as a function of basic structural and technological factors (market size, wage rate, natural resources, regional integration, location, and technical economies of scale) combined with three strategic dimensions. It is argued and demonstrated that, other things remaining equal, nations high on self-sufficiency orientation will give priority to technologies for backward integration. Those not restrictive on imports will get comparative advantage technologies, while restrictiveness would result in technologies for the diversifica-tionofthe consumer goods sector. A highly export oriented strategy will usually encourage forward integration based on processing, etc., of local mineral resources. Some tentative attempts have been made to show how the various factors interact. Further operationalizing of the factors and processual study of their individual effects on the fines of our suggested schema can be the immediate research needs in this area. 
